The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief
In the third lecture of his 1907 Pragmatism, William James famously presented his pragmatic theory of meaning by posing the simple question "what difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?" Accordingly, James's pragmatic method of...
| Author: | |
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2013 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
| Repository: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13459 |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13459 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Pragmatism Pragmatic maxim Practical William James Charles S. Peirce Arthur O. Lovejoy Theory of meaning. Pragmatismo Máxima pragmática prático Teoria do significativo. |
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The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief O Significado do Pragmatismo: James sobre as Consequências Práticas da Crença |
| title |
The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief |
| spellingShingle |
The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief Rydenfelt, Henrik Pragmatism Pragmatic maxim Practical William James Charles S. Peirce Arthur O. Lovejoy Theory of meaning. Pragmatismo Máxima pragmática prático William James Charles S. Peirce Arthur O. Lovejoy Teoria do significativo. |
| title_short |
The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief |
| title_full |
The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief |
| title_fullStr |
The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief |
| title_sort |
The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of Belief |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Rydenfelt, Henrik |
| author |
Rydenfelt, Henrik |
| author_facet |
Rydenfelt, Henrik |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Pragmatism Pragmatic maxim Practical William James Charles S. Peirce Arthur O. Lovejoy Theory of meaning. Pragmatismo Máxima pragmática prático William James Charles S. Peirce Arthur O. Lovejoy Teoria do significativo. |
| topic |
Pragmatism Pragmatic maxim Practical William James Charles S. Peirce Arthur O. Lovejoy Theory of meaning. Pragmatismo Máxima pragmática prático William James Charles S. Peirce Arthur O. Lovejoy Teoria do significativo. |
| description |
In the third lecture of his 1907 Pragmatism, William James famously presented his pragmatic theory of meaning by posing the simple question "what difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?" Accordingly, James's pragmatic method of clarifying the meaning of conceptions was simply to trace what he called their respective "practical consequences."Jame's own application of his pragmatic method, however, has turned out to be prone to invite questions of what exactly he understood by the central notion of "practical consequences." Already in 1908, Arthur O. Lovejoy proposed that James confounds two incrogruent criteria of the meaningfulness of propositions. According to the first criterion, a proposition is meaningful if it refers or predicts future experiences regardless of whether the proposition is believed or not; according to the second, a proposition is meningful if belief in that proposition results in some experiences on the part of the believer, despite the fact no predications by way of future experiences can be deduced from its truth. Many sympathetic commentators have since followed Lovejoy's exampke in holding that there is a duality inherent to James's pragmatism about meaning. Consequently, James has often be regarded as aloowing for merely subjective emotions and interests to play a role in the pragmatism determination of not only the meaning but the truth of the proposition.In this paper, I will argue that Lovejoy's objection is mistaken in its mains claim. The two criteria Lovejoy separates are not incongruent; rather, by pragmatist lights, they are inseparably related. If a proposition has meaning in the light of the first criterion, it is meaningful by the second, and vice versa. Aside arguing for the consistency of James's view, it is shown that his pragmatism is far truer to Charles S. Peirce's original formulation of the pragmatic "third grade of clearness" than commonly supposed. |
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2013 |
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2013-01-25 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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article |
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https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13459 |
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https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13459 |
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eng |
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eng |
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https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13459/9975 |
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Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
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Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
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Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
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Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 10 No. 1 (2009); 81-89 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 10 n. 1 (2009); 81-89 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
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Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
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The Meaning of Pragmatism: James on the Practical Consequences of BeliefO Significado do Pragmatismo: James sobre as Consequências Práticas da CrençaPragmatismPragmatic maximPracticalWilliam JamesCharles S. PeirceArthur O. LovejoyTheory of meaning.PragmatismoMáxima pragmáticapráticoWilliam JamesCharles S. PeirceArthur O. LovejoyTeoria do significativo.In the third lecture of his 1907 Pragmatism, William James famously presented his pragmatic theory of meaning by posing the simple question "what difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?" Accordingly, James's pragmatic method of clarifying the meaning of conceptions was simply to trace what he called their respective "practical consequences."Jame's own application of his pragmatic method, however, has turned out to be prone to invite questions of what exactly he understood by the central notion of "practical consequences." Already in 1908, Arthur O. Lovejoy proposed that James confounds two incrogruent criteria of the meaningfulness of propositions. According to the first criterion, a proposition is meaningful if it refers or predicts future experiences regardless of whether the proposition is believed or not; according to the second, a proposition is meningful if belief in that proposition results in some experiences on the part of the believer, despite the fact no predications by way of future experiences can be deduced from its truth. Many sympathetic commentators have since followed Lovejoy's exampke in holding that there is a duality inherent to James's pragmatism about meaning. Consequently, James has often be regarded as aloowing for merely subjective emotions and interests to play a role in the pragmatism determination of not only the meaning but the truth of the proposition.In this paper, I will argue that Lovejoy's objection is mistaken in its mains claim. The two criteria Lovejoy separates are not incongruent; rather, by pragmatist lights, they are inseparably related. If a proposition has meaning in the light of the first criterion, it is meaningful by the second, and vice versa. Aside arguing for the consistency of James's view, it is shown that his pragmatism is far truer to Charles S. Peirce's original formulation of the pragmatic "third grade of clearness" than commonly supposed.Na terceira palestra de seu Pragmatismo, em 1907, William James apresentou admiravelmente sua teoria pragmática do significado, formulando a simples pergunta: “que diferença prática faria a alguém se esta noção, e não aquela fosse a verdadeira?” Por conseguinte, o método pragmático de James de esclarecer o significado das concepções foi, simplesmente, determinar o que ele chamou de suas respectivas “consequências práticas”.Todavia, a aplicação de James do seu próprio método pragmático, todavia, tornou-se propensa a suscitar questões sobre o que ele entendia exatamente por noção central de “consequências práticas?” Já em 1908, Arthut O. Lovejoy propôs que James confundia os dois critérios incongruentes da significabilidade das proposições. Conforme o primeiro critério, uma proposição é significativa caso faça referência ou preveja experiências futuras, independentemente de a proposição ser crível ou não; conforme o segundo, uma proposição é significativa se a crença nela resulta em algumas experiências por parte do crente, a despeito do fato de que nenhuma afirmação pode ser deduzida de sua verdade por meio de experiências futuras. Muitos comentaristas solidários, posteriormente, seguiram o exemplo de Lovejoy, sustentando que existe uma dualidade inerente ao pragmatismo de James sobre o significado. Tem sido considerado frequentemente que, para James, apenas eventos subjetivos e interesses desempenham um papel na determinação pragmatista não só do significado, como também da verdade da proposição.Neste trabalho, argumentarei que a objeção de Lovejoy é equivocada em sua alegação principal. Os dois critérios que Lovejoy destaca não são incogruentes: pelo contrário, sob uma visão pragmatista, estão intrinsecamente relacionados. Se uma proposição tiver significado à luz do primeiro critério, será significativa pelo segundo e vice-versa. Além de arguir pela consistência da opinião de James, será demonstrado que seu pragmatismo é muito mais fiel à formulação original do “terceiro grau de clareza” pragmática de Charles S. Peirce, do que comumente se pensa.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13459Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 10 No. 1 (2009); 81-89Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 10 n. 1 (2009); 81-892316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13459/9975Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRydenfelt, Henrik2025-07-14T13:37:27Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13459Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2025-07-14T13:37:27Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
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