Emotion, moral judgment and reason: Damasio and the critical of ethical rationalism
The paper seeks to show, in the light of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions, inwhat sense “Descartes’ error” translates into a misconception of ethical rationalisminsofar as it despises the role of the body, matter, and passions in order to acquire and flourish a virtuous life in the field of mora...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/34220 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/34220 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Body. Emotions. Ethics. Mind. Neuroscience. Reason. Cuerpo. Emociones. Ética. Mente. Neurociencia. Razón. Corpo. Emoções. Ética. Mente. Neurociência. Razão. Neuroética |
| Resumo: | The paper seeks to show, in the light of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions, inwhat sense “Descartes’ error” translates into a misconception of ethical rationalisminsofar as it despises the role of the body, matter, and passions in order to acquire and flourish a virtuous life in the field of moral philosophy or even to attain undoubted knowledge in the epistemological field. |
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