Confirmation of conditionals and Carnap’s reduction sentences
Given that the material conditional can be true in three different situations, an empirical datum can confirm different conditionals. In fact, the same datum can confirm even conditionals that appear to be in contradiction with each other. By means of an example presented by Khemlani, Byrne, and Joh...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Repositorio: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufc:article/71064 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/71064 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Carnap. Condicional. Confirmação. Predicado. Sentença de redução. Carnap. Conditional. Confirmation. Predicate. Reduction sentence. |
| Sumario: | Given that the material conditional can be true in three different situations, an empirical datum can confirm different conditionals. In fact, the same datum can confirm even conditionals that appear to be in contradiction with each other. By means of an example presented by Khemlani, Byrne, and Johnson-Laird, this issue is addressed below. To do that, the present paper resorts to the concept of reduction sentence offered by Carnap. The conclusions refer to the idea that, if this last concept is assumed, the problems of the confirmation of the conditional seem to disappear. This is, at least, as far as the example dealt with here is concerned. |
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