Dworkin and Posner on the existence of right answers to legal questions: the reconstruction of a debate
Dworkin responded in the affirmative to the title question of his text “Is there really no right answer in hard cases?”. Posner criticized Dworkin and answered the same question in the negative. This article discusses the different ways in which each philosopher understood the question, and how they...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/9748 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/9748 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Ronald Dworkin. Richard Posner. Right answers. Legal questions. Ronald Dworkin. Richard Posner. Respostas certas. Questões jurídicas. |
| Resumo: | Dworkin responded in the affirmative to the title question of his text “Is there really no right answer in hard cases?”. Posner criticized Dworkin and answered the same question in the negative. This article discusses the different ways in which each philosopher understood the question, and how they lead to different answers to it; that is, in what way differences in the conception of Law entail differences in the existence of correct answers to legal questions. |
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