Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility

In recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso are a good illustr...

ver descrição completa

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Fischborn, Marcelo
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:Brasil
Recursos:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
Repositorio:Princípios (Natal. Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/27258
Acesso em linha:https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/27258
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:moral responsibility
skepticism
punishment
penal reform
responsabilidade moral
ceticismo
punição
reforma penal
id BR_c8c3f2f0f2429ff9f8c44f255df2f7ca
oai_identifier_str oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/27258
network_acronym_str BR
network_name_str Brasil
repository_id_str
spelling Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibilityAprimoramento das práticas punitivas e prevenção distal do crime: Uma alternativa ao ceticismo sobre a responsabilidade moralmoral responsibilityskepticismpunishmentpenal reformresponsabilidade moralceticismopuniçãoreforma penalIn recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso are a good illustration of the change. In their work, they seek not just to defend the claim that we are not free and morally responsible agents (in a specific sense of the terms) but they also propose the reform of the way responsibility practices are actually implemented in our interpersonal relations and, specially, in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the practical implications of Pereboom and Caruso’s skepticism, particularly in what concerns its likelihood of being implemented. I argue that the strictly skeptical core of their proposal is not viable for human beings with a moral psychology like ours, but that nonetheless some elements are consistent with a non-skeptical view focused on the improvement of punitive practices.Em décadas recentes, a investigação filosófica sobre a responsabilidade moral e o livre-arbítrio, que por muito tempo foi vista como um empreendimento em grande medida teórico, passou a também incluir preocupações de tipo mais prático. Essa mudança é bem ilustrada pela proposta cética desenvolvida por autores como Derk Pereboom e Gregg Caruso. Seus trabalhos buscam não apenas defender a tese de que não somos agentes livres e moralmente responsáveis (em um sentido delimitado dos termos), mas também advogar em favor de reformas na maneira como a responsabilização é efetivada em nossas relações interpessoais e, especialmente, no sistema penal. Este artigo examina as implicações práticas do ceticismo de Pereboom e Caruso, especialmente no que diz respeito à sua implementabilidade. Argumento que o núcleo propriamente cético da proposta é inviável para seres humanos com a psicologia moral que temos, mas que, apesar disso, alguns elementos da proposta são compatíveis com uma proposta não-cética focada no aperfeiçoamento das práticas punitivas.EDUFRN2022-08-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/2725810.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59ID27258Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 29 n. 59 (2022): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 233-2471983-21090104-869410.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/27258/15996Copyright (c) 2022 Marcelo Fischbornhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFischborn, Marcelo2022-08-04T23:01:52Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/27258Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2024-01-29T11:51:04.652009Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
Aprimoramento das práticas punitivas e prevenção distal do crime: Uma alternativa ao ceticismo sobre a responsabilidade moral
title Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
spellingShingle Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
Fischborn, Marcelo
moral responsibility
skepticism
punishment
penal reform
responsabilidade moral
ceticismo
punição
reforma penal
title_short Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
title_full Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
title_fullStr Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
title_full_unstemmed Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
title_sort Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Fischborn, Marcelo
author Fischborn, Marcelo
author_facet Fischborn, Marcelo
author_role author
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv moral responsibility
skepticism
punishment
penal reform
responsabilidade moral
ceticismo
punição
reforma penal
topic moral responsibility
skepticism
punishment
penal reform
responsabilidade moral
ceticismo
punição
reforma penal
description In recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso are a good illustration of the change. In their work, they seek not just to defend the claim that we are not free and morally responsible agents (in a specific sense of the terms) but they also propose the reform of the way responsibility practices are actually implemented in our interpersonal relations and, specially, in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the practical implications of Pereboom and Caruso’s skepticism, particularly in what concerns its likelihood of being implemented. I argue that the strictly skeptical core of their proposal is not viable for human beings with a moral psychology like ours, but that nonetheless some elements are consistent with a non-skeptical view focused on the improvement of punitive practices.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-08-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/27258
10.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59ID27258
url https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/27258
identifier_str_mv 10.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59ID27258
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/27258/15996
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Marcelo Fischborn
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Marcelo Fischborn
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 29 n. 59 (2022): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 233-247
1983-2109
0104-8694
10.21680/1983-2109.2022v29n59
reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron:UFRN
instname_str Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron_str UFRN
institution UFRN
reponame_str Princípios (Natal. Online)
collection Princípios (Natal. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||principios@cchla.ufrn.br
_version_ 1853676196442669056
score 15.228081

Registos relacionados