Raciocínios analógicos: representacionalismo ou enativismo?

Analogical reasoning is traditionally conceived as involving comparingmental representations. More recently, with the rise of non-representationa-list theories of human cognition, the question arises of how to explain processes traditionally conceived as representational. In this context, we raiseth...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Figueiredo, Nara Miranda de, Krempel, Raquel, Meurer, César Fernando
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:Brasil
Recursos:Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)
Repositorio:Perspectiva Filosófica (Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/248071
Acesso em linha:https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/248071
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Analogical reasoning
representationalism
enactivism
models
Raciocínio analógico
representacionalismo
enativismo
modelos
Descrição
Resumo:Analogical reasoning is traditionally conceived as involving comparingmental representations. More recently, with the rise of non-representationa-list theories of human cognition, the question arises of how to explain processes traditionally conceived as representational. In this context, we raisethe discussion of whether mental representations will be part of an explana-tion of analogical reasoning, offering opposite perspectives, with the maingoal of promoting debate. First, we present the view that analogical reaso-ning involves  representational mental processes. Next, we present someproblems raised by Fodor for its computational treatment, but we suggestthat these problems do not affect the idea that analogical reasoning involvesmental representations. In the following section, we introduce the linguisticenactivist theory and suggest the possibility that this theory is compatiblewith a conception of analogy as a non-representational categorization pro-cess. Finally, we summarize the two perspectives and suggest that the con-trast of opposite perspectives on cognitive abilities is especially fruitful forour understanding of the mind.