Intentionality or consciousness?

I discuss mainly three points in Fisette’s target paper: 1) Is it true that con- sciousness is as fundamental – or even more fundamental – as intentionality is in Brentano’s philosophy of mind? I shall try to show that intentionality comes first and sheds light on consciousness in Brentano’s work of...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Leclerc, André
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:Brasil
Recursos:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
Repositorio:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:periodicos.ufc:article/19080
Acesso em linha:http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19080
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Brentano. Filosofia da mente. Intencionalidade. Consciência. Auto-consciência.
Brentano. Philosophy of mind. Intentionality. Consciousness. Self-consciouness.
Descrição
Resumo:I discuss mainly three points in Fisette’s target paper: 1) Is it true that con- sciousness is as fundamental – or even more fundamental – as intentionality is in Brentano’s philosophy of mind? I shall try to show that intentionality comes first and sheds light on consciousness in Brentano’s work of 1874; 2) I question the idea of self-consciousness as something intrinsic to a mental agent and irreducible to intentionality; 3) finally, is it possible to read Brentano as an intentionalist? I think it is, even if many intentionalists today would not accept Brentano’s whole conception of the mind.