A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy

In this paper, I present an interpretation about the meaning of value judgements (moral and aesthetic) in the philosophy of David Hume. I state that although they are essentially descriptive of a fact (a sentiment that any spectator placed in the disinterested point of view can feel), these judgemen...

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Autor: Salgadinho, Carlota
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
Repositorio:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/89990
Acceso en línea:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/89990
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:David Hume
Moral Value
Aesthetic Value
Descriptivism
Expressivism
Valor Moral
Valor Estético
Descritivismo
Expressivismo
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spelling A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s PhilosophyUma interpretação conciliadora sobre o significado de juízos de valor na filosofia de David HumeDavid HumeMoral ValueAesthetic ValueDescriptivismExpressivismDavid HumeValor MoralValor EstéticoDescritivismoExpressivismoIn this paper, I present an interpretation about the meaning of value judgements (moral and aesthetic) in the philosophy of David Hume. I state that although they are essentially descriptive of a fact (a sentiment that any spectator placed in the disinterested point of view can feel), these judgements also express a particular sentiment, at least in some cases. To achieve this aim, after introducing the questions and interpretative possibilities approached (section 1), I explain the interpretations called expressivist (mainly, its projectivist subtype, commonly called ‘error theory’) and descriptivist (and its subtypes, called subjectivist and causalist), as well as the problems of accepting each one of them univocally (respectively, sections 2 and 3). Then, I argue in favor of an hybrid or conciliating interpretation according to which Hume’s philosophy is better understood as a form of descriptivism, while preserving an expressivist feature, based on the possibility of solving those problems (section 4).  Neste artigo, apresento uma interpretação sobre o significado de juízos de valor (moral e estético) na filosofia de David Hume. Defendo que apesar de serem essencialmente descritivos de um fato (um sentimento que qualquer espectador é capaz de ter sob um ponto de vista desinteressado), pelo menos nalguns casos, tais juízos também expressam um sentimento particular. Para tal, e após uma introdução sobre as questões e possibilidades interpretativas abordadas (seção 1), explico em que consistem as interpretações expressivista (principalmente no seu subtipo projetivista, comummente designada ‘teoria do erro’) e descritivista (e os seus subtipos, designados subjetivista e causalista) e os problemas de se aceitar cada uma de maneira unívoca (respetivamente, seções 2 e 3). Depois, argumento a favor de uma interpretação híbrida ou conciliadora, de acordo com a qual a filosofia de Hume é melhor compreendida como uma forma de descritivismo, sem, contudo, descartar um elemento expressivista, com base na possibilidade de resolver aqueles problemas (seção 4).Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2023-12-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8999010.5007/1808-1711.2023.e89990Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 3 (2023); 453-474Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 3 (2023); 453-474Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 3 (2023); 453-4741808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/89990/55060Copyright (c) 2023 Carlota Salgadinhohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSalgadinho, Carlota2023-12-27T11:00:27Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/89990Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-12-27T11:00:27Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
Uma interpretação conciliadora sobre o significado de juízos de valor na filosofia de David Hume
title A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
spellingShingle A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
Salgadinho, Carlota
David Hume
Moral Value
Aesthetic Value
Descriptivism
Expressivism
David Hume
Valor Moral
Valor Estético
Descritivismo
Expressivismo
title_short A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
title_full A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
title_fullStr A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
title_full_unstemmed A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
title_sort A Conciliatory Interpretation of the Meaning of Value Judgements in David Hume’s Philosophy
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Salgadinho, Carlota
author Salgadinho, Carlota
author_facet Salgadinho, Carlota
author_role author
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv David Hume
Moral Value
Aesthetic Value
Descriptivism
Expressivism
David Hume
Valor Moral
Valor Estético
Descritivismo
Expressivismo
topic David Hume
Moral Value
Aesthetic Value
Descriptivism
Expressivism
David Hume
Valor Moral
Valor Estético
Descritivismo
Expressivismo
description In this paper, I present an interpretation about the meaning of value judgements (moral and aesthetic) in the philosophy of David Hume. I state that although they are essentially descriptive of a fact (a sentiment that any spectator placed in the disinterested point of view can feel), these judgements also express a particular sentiment, at least in some cases. To achieve this aim, after introducing the questions and interpretative possibilities approached (section 1), I explain the interpretations called expressivist (mainly, its projectivist subtype, commonly called ‘error theory’) and descriptivist (and its subtypes, called subjectivist and causalist), as well as the problems of accepting each one of them univocally (respectively, sections 2 and 3). Then, I argue in favor of an hybrid or conciliating interpretation according to which Hume’s philosophy is better understood as a form of descriptivism, while preserving an expressivist feature, based on the possibility of solving those problems (section 4).  
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-12-27
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/89990
10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e89990
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/89990
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e89990
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/89990/55060
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Carlota Salgadinho
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Carlota Salgadinho
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 3 (2023); 453-474
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 3 (2023); 453-474
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 3 (2023); 453-474
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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score 15,301629

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