Fidelidade e governança corporativa em cooperativas: um estudo empírico com as cooperativas paulistas
Clauses of fidelity and loyalty policies are common elements in most of the cooperatives enterprises statutes and they are present in the discussions on how to intensify the commitment of members with their cooperative. The academic literature has already presented several factors that can influence...
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| Format: | master thesis |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2008 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repository: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
| Language: | Portuguese |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/1803 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/1803 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Instituições Fidelidade Cooperativas Comprometimento Governança corporativa Economia Cooperativas - Administração Clientes - Fidelização |
| Summary: | Clauses of fidelity and loyalty policies are common elements in most of the cooperatives enterprises statutes and they are present in the discussions on how to intensify the commitment of members with their cooperative. The academic literature has already presented several factors that can influence the members’ commitment/loyalty. However, few answers were given to the influence of the cooperative’s institutional design can exert on their members’ compromise or the loyalty. Recognizing the cooperative as a group whose main goal is the collective goods provision through collective action and using available information in the PDICOOPs database - which has data in panel format for the years 1989, 1992 and 2000 -, this dissertation empirically assess whether there is an inverse relationship between earnings of collective action and coordination costs which can be significantly associated with the cooperative members commitment, and ultimately whether the level of members commitment helps to explain the cooperative financial performance. |
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