Intentionality and consciousness by Searle

The objective of this article is to present a critical analysis about the relation between intentionality and consciousness in John Searle. According to this author, these phenomena are closely related to each other, but the concepts of intentionality and consciousness are not equivalent and neither...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Carvalho, Joelma Marques de
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
Repositorio:Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/12550
Acceso en línea:https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/12550
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Searle
Intencionalidade
Consciência
Inconsciente
Pano de fundo
Estatuto ontológico
Intentionality
Consciousness
Unconsciousness
Background
Ontological status
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spelling Intentionality and consciousness by SearleIntencionalidade e consciência em SearleSearleIntencionalidadeConsciênciaInconscientePano de fundoEstatuto ontológicoSearleIntentionalityConsciousnessUnconsciousnessBackgroundOntological statusThe objective of this article is to present a critical analysis about the relation between intentionality and consciousness in John Searle. According to this author, these phenomena are closely related to each other, but the concepts of intentionality and consciousness are not equivalent and neither of them comprises the other completely, for the preposition “of” in expressions with intentionality does not mean the same as the preposition “of” in expressions with consciousness. However, by means of a deeper analysis of Searle’s theory of mind, especially about the ontological status of the content of unconscious states, it is possible to see that the separation between intentionality and consciousness defended by Searle is questionable.O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma análise crítica sobre a relação entre intencionalidade e consciência em John Searle. Conforme este autor, estes fenômenos são intimamente relacionados entre si, mas os conceitos de intencionalidade e consciência não são equivalentes e nenhum deles abrange completamente o outro, pois a preposição “de” em expressões da intencionalidade não significa o mesmo que a preposição “de” nas expressões da consciência. No entanto, através de uma análise mais profunda da teoria searleana da mente, especialmente acerca do estatuto ontológico dos conteúdos dos estados inconscientes, é possível perceber que a separação entre intencionalidade e consciência defendida por Searle é questionável.Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília2017-05-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/1255010.26512/rfmc.v4i2.12550Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2016); 54-66Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea; Vol. 4 Núm. 2 (2016); 54-66Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea; v. 4 n. 2 (2016); 54-662317-9570reponame:Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporâneainstname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBporhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/12550/10967Copyright (c) 2017 Joelma Marques de Carvalhoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCarvalho, Joelma Marques de2019-09-01T03:05:39Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/12550Revistahttp://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/indexPUBhttp://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/oaiperiodicos.bce@unb.br | rfmc.ppgfilunb@gmail.com | hahn.alexandre@gmail.com2317-95702317-9570opendoar:2019-09-01T03:05:39Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
Intencionalidade e consciência em Searle
title Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
spellingShingle Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
Carvalho, Joelma Marques de
Searle
Intencionalidade
Consciência
Inconsciente
Pano de fundo
Estatuto ontológico
Searle
Intentionality
Consciousness
Unconsciousness
Background
Ontological status
title_short Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
title_full Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
title_fullStr Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
title_full_unstemmed Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
title_sort Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Carvalho, Joelma Marques de
author Carvalho, Joelma Marques de
author_facet Carvalho, Joelma Marques de
author_role author
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Searle
Intencionalidade
Consciência
Inconsciente
Pano de fundo
Estatuto ontológico
Searle
Intentionality
Consciousness
Unconsciousness
Background
Ontological status
topic Searle
Intencionalidade
Consciência
Inconsciente
Pano de fundo
Estatuto ontológico
Searle
Intentionality
Consciousness
Unconsciousness
Background
Ontological status
description The objective of this article is to present a critical analysis about the relation between intentionality and consciousness in John Searle. According to this author, these phenomena are closely related to each other, but the concepts of intentionality and consciousness are not equivalent and neither of them comprises the other completely, for the preposition “of” in expressions with intentionality does not mean the same as the preposition “of” in expressions with consciousness. However, by means of a deeper analysis of Searle’s theory of mind, especially about the ontological status of the content of unconscious states, it is possible to see that the separation between intentionality and consciousness defended by Searle is questionable.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-05-21
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/12550
10.26512/rfmc.v4i2.12550
url https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/12550
identifier_str_mv 10.26512/rfmc.v4i2.12550
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/12550/10967
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Joelma Marques de Carvalho
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Joelma Marques de Carvalho
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2016); 54-66
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea; Vol. 4 Núm. 2 (2016); 54-66
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea; v. 4 n. 2 (2016); 54-66
2317-9570
reponame:Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea
instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron:UNB
instname_str Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron_str UNB
institution UNB
reponame_str Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea
collection Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv periodicos.bce@unb.br | rfmc.ppgfilunb@gmail.com | hahn.alexandre@gmail.com
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score 15,301629

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