An alternative and Kantian interpretation of the Libet experiment: in defense of free will
The main objective of this work is to analyze the consequences of Libet's experiments to Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant claimed that the freedom and autonomy of the will are the necessary principles of morality. From these concepts, he developed a procedure of moral inquiry capable of judging th...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
| Repositorio: | Kant e-prints (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8673618 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/kant/article/view/8673618 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Kant Libet Ética Liberdade Livre-arbítrio Ethic Freedom Free will |
| Sumario: | The main objective of this work is to analyze the consequences of Libet's experiments to Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant claimed that the freedom and autonomy of the will are the necessary principles of morality. From these concepts, he developed a procedure of moral inquiry capable of judging the correctness of our maxims, the Categorical Imperative. Benjamin Libet, - an American neuroscientist - performed experiments in which volunteers, monitored by an EEG (electroencephalogram) machine were instructed to move their hand/wrist when they felt like it. The results of this experiment revealed electrical changes in brain activity prior to activation of the muscle involved. This would indicate that the action started before the subject decided and became aware of it. Such conclusions would put in doubt the free will existence possibility. Faced with this new discovery, is it still possible to defend the moral philosophy of freedom, developed by Kant? |
|---|