Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game

This paper aims at showing how analytical techniques can be employed to explain the global emerged behavior of a heterogeneous population of ultimatum game players, over different strategies, by calculating their payoff moments. The ultimatum game is a game, in which two players are offered a gift t...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Silva, Roberto da, Kellermann, Gustavo Adolfo
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2007
País:Brasil
Recursos:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)
Repositorio:Repositório Institucional da UFRGS
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/75801
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10183/75801
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Inteligência artificial
Agentes inteligentes
Jogos : Estrategia
Evolutionary game theory
Ultimatum game
Payoff moments
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spelling 2013-07-11T02:22:21Z20070103-9733http://hdl.handle.net/10183/75801000657511This paper aims at showing how analytical techniques can be employed to explain the global emerged behavior of a heterogeneous population of ultimatum game players, over different strategies, by calculating their payoff moments. The ultimatum game is a game, in which two players are offered a gift to be shared. One of the players (the proposer) suggests how to divide the offer while the other player (the responder) can either agree or reject the deal. Computer simulations were performed considering the concept of turns (in every turn each participant plays necessarily only once, which is equivalent to performing matching a graph) in the game. We reproduce by simulations the expected analytical results at the limit of high number of turns. From these results, we are capable of establishing diagrams to say where each strategy is the best (optimal strategy).application/pdfengBrazilian journal of physics. São Paulo. Vol. 37, no. 4 (Dec.2007), p. 1206-1211Inteligência artificialAgentes inteligentesJogos : EstrategiaEvolutionary game theoryUltimatum gamePayoff momentsAnalyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum gameinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRGSinstname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)instacron:UFRGSSilva, Roberto daKellermann, Gustavo AdolfoORIGINAL000657511.pdf000657511.pdfTexto completo (inglês)application/pdf4559019http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/75801/1/000657511.pdf441f04cd0e6e21cecee55fa0185699e7MD51TEXT000657511.pdf.txt000657511.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain21318http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/75801/2/000657511.pdf.txtf906fd5cd478c9e4625491c95ade0370MD52THUMBNAIL000657511.pdf.jpg000657511.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1839http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/75801/3/000657511.pdf.jpg2a7b4fbe03e7b6f6d4bc33b77ee73d8eMD5310183/758012018-10-15 07:54:48.061oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/75801Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://lume.ufrgs.br/oai/requestlume@ufrgs.bropendoar:2018-10-15T10:54:48Repositório Institucional da UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)false
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
title Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
spellingShingle Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
Silva, Roberto da
Inteligência artificial
Agentes inteligentes
Jogos : Estrategia
Evolutionary game theory
Ultimatum game
Payoff moments
title_short Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
title_full Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
title_fullStr Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
title_full_unstemmed Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
title_sort Analyzing the payoff of a heterogeneous population in the ultimatum game
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Silva, Roberto da
Kellermann, Gustavo Adolfo
author Silva, Roberto da
author_facet Silva, Roberto da
Kellermann, Gustavo Adolfo
author_role author
author2 Kellermann, Gustavo Adolfo
author2_role author
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Inteligência artificial
Agentes inteligentes
Jogos : Estrategia
topic Inteligência artificial
Agentes inteligentes
Jogos : Estrategia
Evolutionary game theory
Ultimatum game
Payoff moments
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Evolutionary game theory
Ultimatum game
Payoff moments
description This paper aims at showing how analytical techniques can be employed to explain the global emerged behavior of a heterogeneous population of ultimatum game players, over different strategies, by calculating their payoff moments. The ultimatum game is a game, in which two players are offered a gift to be shared. One of the players (the proposer) suggests how to divide the offer while the other player (the responder) can either agree or reject the deal. Computer simulations were performed considering the concept of turns (in every turn each participant plays necessarily only once, which is equivalent to performing matching a graph) in the game. We reproduce by simulations the expected analytical results at the limit of high number of turns. From these results, we are capable of establishing diagrams to say where each strategy is the best (optimal strategy).
publishDate 2007
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2007
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10183/75801
dc.identifier.issn.pt_BR.fl_str_mv 0103-9733
dc.identifier.nrb.pt_BR.fl_str_mv 000657511
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.relation.ispartof.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Brazilian journal of physics. São Paulo. Vol. 37, no. 4 (Dec.2007), p. 1206-1211
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