Critique of Purpose to Scientific Rationality: The Radical Loss of the Lifeworld
Criticism of purpose exposes the limits of scientific rationality. As a product of this, we want to question the consequences of objectivism in its relationship with the departure from the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). We will start with a critique of scientific reason based on the foundations announced b...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/30128 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/30128 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Atitude fenomenológica, Mundo vital, Edmund Husserl. Phenomenological attitude, vital world, Edmund Husserl. |
| Sumario: | Criticism of purpose exposes the limits of scientific rationality. As a product of this, we want to question the consequences of objectivism in its relationship with the departure from the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). We will start with a critique of scientific reason based on the foundations announced by Edmund Husserl regarding the phenomenology of the crisis. Indeed, a phenomenological argument will seek elements that the enterprise of modern teleological rationality has limited the very way of thinking and doing science and, therefore, leading humanity to an abandonment of the moral world. Therefore, in turning to the vital horizon of the life-world, there is a need for the very negation of objectivism as a necessary attitude for renewal. |
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