J. L. Austin e Alvin Goldman: conhecimento empírico e alternativas relevantes
Our aim in this paper is to discuss the empirical knowledge such as John L. Austin and Alvin Goldman’s theories. For this, we will argue that the traditional definition of knowledge (justified true belief) is insufficient to deal with empirical knowledge. We will argue that the proper way to analyze...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/230296 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/230296 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | John L. Austin Alvin Goldman empirical knowledge discrimination relevant alternatives conhecimento empírico discriminação alternativas relevantes |
| Sumario: | Our aim in this paper is to discuss the empirical knowledge such as John L. Austin and Alvin Goldman’s theories. For this, we will argue that the traditional definition of knowledge (justified true belief) is insufficient to deal with empirical knowledge. We will argue that the proper way to analyze the empirical knowledge must take into account the ability of the cognizer to discriminate an empirical proposition p from relevant alternatives to the case. |
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