AS PRÁTICAS DE CONLUIO NAS LICITAÇÕES PÚBLICAS À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
The present article analyzes as the cartels act in the public administration and if the inserted rules in the biddings are efficient in the combat to the practical ones of collusions and generate incentives them bidders to present true proposals (those that they do not extract all exceeding economic...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2009 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) |
| Repositorio: | Análise Econômica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:seer.ufrgs.br:article/10919 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/AnaliseEconomica/article/view/10919 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Licitações Públicas. Conluios. Teoria dos Jogos. JEL Classification D43 D44 D82 H57 Bidding. Collusions. Game Theory. |
| Sumario: | The present article analyzes as the cartels act in the public administration and if the inserted rules in the biddings are efficient in the combat to the practical ones of collusions and generate incentives them bidders to present true proposals (those that they do not extract all exceeding economic). In sight of this, it is used games theory and the economic theory of the cartels as analysis instruments. The main conclusions of the article are that the economic incentives glimpsed by the agents and the limited effectiveness of the relative instruments of bidding to the spreading procedures, judgment and declassification of the proposals do not prevent the practical ones of collusion in the acquisitions of the public sector, except in the electronic biddings with many participants, where the probability of success of the practical ones of collusion is reduced. |
|---|