What is cumulative knowledge after all?
After the 60’s, and especially after the repercussion of kuhn’s work, it became trivial to distinguish between a continuist and a discontinuist point of view in relation to the scientific progress. Kuhn came to be seen as the great discontinuist, along with Koyré and Butterfield, and he was the one...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2018 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositório: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | português |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/22002 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/22002 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | cumulativeness continuity Sarton Conant Kuhn. acumulação continuidade |
| Resumo: | After the 60’s, and especially after the repercussion of kuhn’s work, it became trivial to distinguish between a continuist and a discontinuist point of view in relation to the scientific progress. Kuhn came to be seen as the great discontinuist, along with Koyré and Butterfield, and he was the one considered responsible for a major change in the way of conceiving the development of science. In several approaches the notion of continuity has been usually equivalent to the notion of cumulativeness, which necessarily implies the assumption of the absence of revolutions in science. This paper tries to show that the use of the “cumulativist” or “continuist” epithets as opposed to “discontinuous” can both evoke misinterpretations of historical views and establish approximations between very different views. This seems clear when ones analyzes, e.g., Sarton, Conant and Kuhn’s views about cumulativeness, the task this paper proposes to do. The analysis provides considerations on the roles of these thinkers in the history of science. |
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