Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenousl...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Menezes, Flavio Marques, Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2000
País:Brasil
Institución:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
Repositorio:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/377
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10438/377
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Sequential auctions
Endogenous participation
Economia
Leilões
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spelling Escolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:23:10Z2010-09-23T18:57:53Z2008-05-13T15:23:10Z2010-09-23T18:57:53Z2000-01-260104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/377In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.engFundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em EconomiaEnsaios Econômicos;364Sequential auctionsEndogenous participationEconomiaEconomiaLeilõesWhy do bidders drop out from a sequential auctioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMenezes, Flavio MarquesEngelbrecht-Wiggans, RichardTHUMBNAIL1214.pdf.jpg1214.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4214https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/55a948e9-8552-424d-a291-85026cab0bef/download8256c3533edf165fd9dbb05b91047e12MD58ORIGINAL1214.pdfapplication/pdf169820https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/f229c7d6-aa63-46af-9cf4-ff0887f7333b/downloadc2ec66f8c034576465cee17d55efde16MD52TEXT1214.pdf.txt1214.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain41219https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/dee63859-03c9-44a5-b202-595f2c4cc627/download1c93105b5ab7b0da6cce88e212a4a02eMD5710438/3772023-11-09 20:12:37.564open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/377https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T20:12:37Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
title Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
spellingShingle Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
Menezes, Flavio Marques
Sequential auctions
Endogenous participation
Economia
Economia
Leilões
title_short Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
title_full Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
title_fullStr Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
title_full_unstemmed Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
title_sort Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Menezes, Flavio Marques
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
author Menezes, Flavio Marques
author_facet Menezes, Flavio Marques
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
author_role author
author2 Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
author2_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EPGE
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv FGV
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Sequential auctions
Endogenous participation
topic Sequential auctions
Endogenous participation
Economia
Economia
Leilões
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Economia
Leilões
description In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.
publishDate 2000
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2000-01-26
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:23:10Z
2010-09-23T18:57:53Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:23:10Z
2010-09-23T18:57:53Z
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10438/377
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0104-8910
identifier_str_mv 0104-8910
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/377
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv Ensaios Econômicos;364
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia
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