Essays on incentives, procurement and regulation
This thesis is composed of three articles. The first article, 'Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard', considers a principal-agent problem under the simultaneous presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection, where the adverse selection dimension is g...
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| Formato: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/11744 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/11744 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Risco moral Parceria público-privada Regulação Seleção adversa Adverse selection Moral hazard Public-private partnership Regulation Economia Agências reguladoras de atividades privadas Seleção adversa (Seguros) |
| Resumo: | This thesis is composed of three articles. The first article, 'Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard', considers a principal-agent problem under the simultaneous presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection, where the adverse selection dimension is given over the outcome conditional probabilities given the agents actions. The second article, 'Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection' analyses the optimality of private-public partnerships under the presence of adverse selection. The third article, 'Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure', by its turn, considers the problem of regulating publicly traded companies, where firms have incentives to send opposing signals to the regulator and the market. |
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