Hybrid Auctions I: Theory

In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more t...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Menezes, Flavio Marques, Dutra, Joísa Campanher
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2001
País:Brasil
Recursos:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
Repositorio:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/405
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10438/405
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Hybrid auctions
Expected revenue
Efficiency
Economia
Leilões
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spelling Escolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:23:36Z2010-09-23T18:57:49Z2008-05-13T15:23:36Z2010-09-23T18:57:49Z2001-05-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/405In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;421Hybrid auctionsExpected revenueEfficiencyEconomiaEconomiaLeilõesHybrid Auctions I: Theoryinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMenezes, Flavio MarquesDutra, Joísa CampanherTHUMBNAIL1268.pdf.jpg1268.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4057https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/40034457-4f73-4efe-a1ea-6d66602637bf/downloadcfb0e362695f6fe8e8cc57081ae86c55MD58ORIGINAL1268.pdfapplication/pdf370503https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/abd287ba-cfd5-45da-a997-a3823f0e2f37/downloadf3ffb4703956b4c0872cd15c8639cb50MD52TEXT1268.pdf.txt1268.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain42233https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/246d7957-d1cb-417c-88e4-e30a8100bb78/download86b49736d35e30302879893580020843MD5710438/4052023-11-09 20:09:38.124open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/405https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T20:09:38Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
title Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
spellingShingle Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
Menezes, Flavio Marques
Hybrid auctions
Expected revenue
Efficiency
Economia
Economia
Leilões
title_short Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
title_full Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
title_fullStr Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
title_full_unstemmed Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
title_sort Hybrid Auctions I: Theory
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Menezes, Flavio Marques
Dutra, Joísa Campanher
author Menezes, Flavio Marques
author_facet Menezes, Flavio Marques
Dutra, Joísa Campanher
author_role author
author2 Dutra, Joísa Campanher
author2_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EPGE
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv FGV
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Hybrid auctions
Expected revenue
Efficiency
topic Hybrid auctions
Expected revenue
Efficiency
Economia
Economia
Leilões
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Economia
Leilões
description In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.
publishDate 2001
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2001-05-01
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:23:36Z
2010-09-23T18:57:49Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:23:36Z
2010-09-23T18:57:49Z
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10438/405
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0104-8910
identifier_str_mv 0104-8910
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/405
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv Ensaios Econômicos;421
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
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instacron:FGV
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