Hume: causal theory of freedom and indeterminism
Although Hume seems to suppose that natural processes occur in a deterministic way, his conception of causality prohibits us from knowing them as deterministic. The reason is that for him the idea of a necessary connection between events is purely psychological. In our analysis of this question, we...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1993 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
| Repositorio: | Trans/Form/Ação (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www2.marilia.unesp.br:article/12369 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/12369 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Indeterminismo Causalidade Liberdade Necessidade Acaso Indeterminism causality Freedom Necessity Chance |
| Sumario: | Although Hume seems to suppose that natural processes occur in a deterministic way, his conception of causality prohibits us from knowing them as deterministic. The reason is that for him the idea of a necessary connection between events is purely psychological. In our analysis of this question, we argue that: a) in his main references about causality, Hume does not assume a strong ontological commitment with determinism; b) certain parts of his texts suggest that indeterminism is non eliminable, in the knowledge of nature; and c) his causal conception of freedom supposes indeterminism in natural processes, and not in our knowledge of them only. |
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