Expert knowledge, evidence, and information
In this paper I argue that the existence of expert knowledge potentially poses a problem for Evidentialism, the view that a person’s justification supervenes on the evidence this person has. An expert is the kind of person from which knowledge (or justified belief) is expected in situations in which...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2010 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/10233 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/10233 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Expert knowledge. Evidentialism. Evidence. Epistemic justification. Information. Perception. Conhecimento por especialista. Evidencialismo. |
| Sumario: | In this paper I argue that the existence of expert knowledge potentially poses a problem for Evidentialism, the view that a person’s justification supervenes on the evidence this person has. An expert is the kind of person from which knowledge (or justified belief) is expected in situations in which a non-expert would normally not attain knowledge (or justified belief); so, potentially, the epistemic status of their beliefs differ even if the evidence they possess seems to be the same. A viable solution to this problem has to show that, appearances to the contrary, the expert and the non-expert, in the problematic cases, do not possess the same evidence. I propose a solution to this problem by defending a principle that specifies the conditions under which a piece of information should be counted as evidence. |
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