HOW TO NEGATE A NAME
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a name is always a propositional function. Wittgenstein makes a radical shift in the Fregean opposition between saturated and unsaturated entities. Any sentential component which is not itself a sentence is unsaturated. The proposition is therefore a synthesis...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2010 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG) |
| Repositorio: | Revista philósophos |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistas.ufg.br:article/8924 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/8924 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Philosophy of language philosophy of logic negation propositional function name Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Filosofia da linguagem filosofia da lógica negação função proposicional nome |
| Sumario: | In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a name is always a propositional function. Wittgenstein makes a radical shift in the Fregean opposition between saturated and unsaturated entities. Any sentential component which is not itself a sentence is unsaturated. The proposition is therefore a synthesis of propositional functions. The name is just a limit case of propositional function, and as such it can be negated. |
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