Are Works of Art essentially Institutional?
This paper examines the arguments presented by Monroe Beardsley against the thesis that art is essentially institutional. Beardsley’s criticism targets the most refined version of an institutional theory of art, namely George Dickie’s theory. He argues that Dickie employs the term “institution” ambi...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG) |
| Repositorio: | Revista philósophos |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistas.ufg.br:article/52321 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/52321 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Estética definição de arte teoria institucional da arte. |
| Sumario: | This paper examines the arguments presented by Monroe Beardsley against the thesis that art is essentially institutional. Beardsley’s criticism targets the most refined version of an institutional theory of art, namely George Dickie’s theory. He argues that Dickie employs the term “institution” ambiguously, as a token and a type, and that asserting the existence of an institutional context is not the same as claiming that the activities that presuppose this context are institutional. This paper is intended to show that although Dickie restated his theory to reinforce his initial thesis, he cannot satisfactorily respond to socalled “Beardsley-Anscombe Argument”. In addition, this papers briefly presents and discusses Dickie’s latest approach, in which he argues that art is a cultural kind. |
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