Why an ideal theory of justice?
Why the normative political theory focused on questions of social and political justice should devote itself to principles in the ambit which John Rawls denominated “ideal theory”, in contrast to “non-ideal theory” of justice? Are we to develop and refine an ideal theory of justice if what we want i...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
| Repositorio: | Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/71026 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/71026 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Teoria política normativa Justiça rawlsiana Teoria ideal Teoria não ideal Normative political theory Rawlsian justice Ideal theory Non-ideal theory |
| Sumario: | Why the normative political theory focused on questions of social and political justice should devote itself to principles in the ambit which John Rawls denominated “ideal theory”, in contrast to “non-ideal theory” of justice? Are we to develop and refine an ideal theory of justice if what we want is to specify what justice require from us in the non ideal circumstances we face? Is the “ideal theory” of justice capable to offer guidance to action – political decisions and institutional choices – in non-ideal conditions? If the answer to these questions is “no”, then we should above all devote our efforts to the formulation of a non-ideal theory of justice. In the strongest versions of this objection, such as Amartya Sen’s in The Idea of Justice, we may entirely do without an ideal theory of justice. To rebut Sen’s objection, which is also shared, in different ways, by authors such as Onora O’Neill, Colin Farrelly, and Charles Mills, this article develops a two-step argument. Firstly, it is argued that there are reasons to value ideal theorization that are independent to the relations it may have to non-ideal theory. Secondly, it is argued that the ideal theory of justice, notwithstanding all the normative and empirical work that remains to be done, is essential to determinate what justice requires from us here and now. |
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