Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic

In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and...

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Authors: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco, Szmuc, Damián Enrique
Format: article
Status:Published version
Publication Date:2018
Country:Argentina
Institution:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
Repository:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Language:English
OAI Identifier:oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/97039
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/97039
network_acronym_str AR
network_name_str Argentina
repository_id_str
spelling Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logicLo Guercio, Nicolás FranciscoSzmuc, Damián EnriquePARACONSISTENT LOGICBASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCEEPISTEMOLOGYPERMISSIVISMhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaUniversidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía2018-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/zipapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-1701414-42471808-1711CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2024-05-08T13:38:19Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/97039instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982024-05-08 13:38:19.972CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
spellingShingle Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
title_short Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_full Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_fullStr Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_full_unstemmed Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
title_sort Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
Szmuc, Damián Enrique
author Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author_facet Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
Szmuc, Damián Enrique
author_role author
author2 Szmuc, Damián Enrique
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
topic PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
BASIC LOGIC OF EVIDENCE
EPISTEMOLOGY
PERMISSIVISM
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
description In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues's interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-04
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-170
1414-4247
1808-1711
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/97039
identifier_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Szmuc, Damián Enrique; Remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía; Principia; 22; 1; 4-2018; 153-170
1414-4247
1808-1711
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p153
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/zip
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Departamento de Filosofía
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 15.228081

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