Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists

There is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to sur...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Parsons, Simon, Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio, Klein, Mark
Tipo de documento: artigo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Data de publicação:2011
País:España
Recursos:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositório:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/138211
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/138211
Access Level:Acceso aberto
Palavra-chave:Auction theory
Resource allocation
Auctions
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spelling Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientistsParsons, SimonRodríguez-Aguilar, Juan AntonioKlein, MarkAuction theoryResource allocationAuctionsThere is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions. © 2011 ACM.This work was funded in part by HP under the “Always on” grant, by NSF IIS-0329037 “Tools and Techniques for Automated Mechanism Design”, and by IEA (TIN2006-15662-C02-01), OK (IST-4-027253-STP), eREP(EC-FP6-CIT5-28575) and Agreement Technologies (CONSOLIDER CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010).Peer ReviewedAssociation for Computing MachineryConsejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]2016201620112016info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Postprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/138211reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)InglésSíinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1382112026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
title Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
spellingShingle Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
Parsons, Simon
Auction theory
Resource allocation
Auctions
title_short Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
title_full Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
title_fullStr Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
title_full_unstemmed Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
title_sort Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Parsons, Simon
Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio
Klein, Mark
author Parsons, Simon
author_facet Parsons, Simon
Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio
Klein, Mark
author_role author
author2 Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio
Klein, Mark
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Auction theory
Resource allocation
Auctions
topic Auction theory
Resource allocation
Auctions
description There is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions. © 2011 ACM.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
2016
2016
2016
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/138211
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/138211
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Sí
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Association for Computing Machinery
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Association for Computing Machinery
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