Informed entry in auctions

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference...

ver descrição completa

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Aycinena Abascal, Diego, Bejarano H., Rentschler L.
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:Colombia
Recursos:Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24357
Acesso em linha:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
Descrição
Resumo:We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude. © 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany.