The relation between epistemic competence and knowledge in Ernest Sosa’s theory
This paper focuses on the attribution relation between competence and true belief present in epistemic virtue accounts of knowledge such as Sosa’s theory. The core idea is that in cases of knowledge the fact that the agent gets a true belief is attributable to her cognitive competence (competencecon...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2022 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
| Repository: | Trans/Form/Ação (Online) |
| Language: | Portuguese |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www2.marilia.unesp.br:article/10972 |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/10972 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Condição da Competência Confiabilismo da Virtude Ernest Sosa Conhecimento Manifestação da Competência Relação de Atribuição Attribution Relation Competence Condition Knowledge Manifestation of Competence Virtue Reliabilism |
| Summary: | This paper focuses on the attribution relation between competence and true belief present in epistemic virtue accounts of knowledge such as Sosa’s theory. The core idea is that in cases of knowledge the fact that the agent gets a true belief is attributable to her cognitive competence (competencecondition), and not to some lucky factor. Critics have presented cases where, purportedly, the agent can either have knowledge without satisfying the competence condition (therefore, the competence condition would not be necessary for knowledge), or, despite the satisfaction of the competence condition, the agent has no knowledge (therefore, the competence condition would not be sufficient for knowledge). The crux of the matter lies in how to conceive properly the competence condition forknowledge, and the underlying relationship between competence and success in the epistemic domain. This paper explores Sosa’s view of this relationship in terms of “cognitive success that manifests the agent’s competence”, and proposes that it provides a more direct answer to the critics than do other epistemic virtue accounts of knowledge. |
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