On favoritism in auctions with entry
We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | Argentina |
| Institución: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repositorio: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/191933 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/191933 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | AUCTIONS ENDOGENOUS NUMBER OF BIDDERS FAVORITISM FREE ENTRY https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
| Sumario: | We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal. |
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